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1 CONSUMPTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
THE ROLE OF PERVERSE SUBSIDIES 
Norman Myers 
It is often asserted (e.g. Brown et aI., 1997; Myers, 1997; Serageldin, 1995; United 
Nations Development Programme, 1997) that: 
(a) Sustainable development cannot be achieved with the present patterns and trends of 
consumption, or rather over-consumption on the part of  aflluent societies and under-
consumption on the part of  impoverished societies. 
(b) Both forms of  mis-consumption, and most especially the first, are stimulated by 
widespread subsidies in countries West, East, North and South. 
Apart from their adverse impact on consumption behaviour, many subsidies are harmful 
economically, environmentally and/or socially.  They are often adverse in two of  these three 
respects, sometimes in all three.  In this paper, we shall accept that when a subsidy militates 
against the long-term interests of  the community at large by being harmful in both environmental 
and economic/social senses, they will be termed "perverse" subsidies. 
This paper examines the phenomenon of  subsidies and particularly perverse subsidies, in 
order to assess how far they are a major roadblock on the way to sustainable development.  We 
shall look at four prominent sectors of  development that have long been subjected to an array of 
subsidies: agriculture, fossil fuels, road transportation, and water. 
2 1. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Subsidies are a prime feature of  our economic landscape.  They have long been thought 
(Panayotou, 1993; Roodman, 1996; see also de Moor, 1997) to total around $1  trillion 
worldwide per year, which means they playa prime role in the functioning of  economies with a 
global aggregate of$28 trillion.  Ifperverse subsidies amount to a sizeable proportion of 
subsidies overall, they exert a significantly distortive impact on the global economy.  They can 
also be environmentally detrimental.  Subsidies for agriculture foster over-loading of  croplands, 
leading to erosion oftopsoil, pollution from synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and release of 
greenhouse gases among other adverse effects.  Subsidies for fossil fuels aggravate pollution 
effects such as acid rain, urban smog and global warming.  Subsidies for road transportation 
promote some of  the worst forms of  pollution, plus excessive road building with loss of 
landscape amenity and other environmental ills.  Subsidies for water encourage mis-use and 
over-use of  supplies that are increasingly scarce in many lands.  Subsidies for fisheries foster 
over-harvesting of  depleted fish stocks. 
This is not to say that subsidies cannot serve many useful purposes. They can overcome 
deficiencies ofthe marketplace, they can support disadvantaged segments of  society, and they 
can promote environmentally friendly technologies.  Despite their distortionary effects in many 
instances, there is nothing necessarily bad about subsidies.  Sometimes we need a bit of  positive 
distortion, otherwise we might never get as much as we want of  e.g. non-polluting and 
renewable sources of  energy with their many benefits--economic, environmental, political, social 
and even security benefits.  True, these energy sources should be able to make their way in the 
3 marketplace when once they become established.  But without help in their opening phase, they 
might never become established at all because of  competition from entrenched energy sources. 
The same applies to recycling, dematerialization, agricultural set-asides, and a host of  other 
subsidies beneficial to both the economy and the environment. 
The key question is:  which subsidies, of  what sorts, of  what scope and with what 
impacts, can be viewed as "perverse", i.e. adverse to society's overall interests?  The answer to 
this key question is the purpose ofthis paper. 
Subsidies come in many shapes and sizes.  They range from financial transfers to 
opportunity costs, and they can be both direct and indirect.  Any conventional subsidy is a form 
of  government support to an economic sector (or institution, business, individual) with the aim 
of  promoting an activity that the government considers beneficial to the economy overall and to 
society at large.  Indeed, this is one of  the main roles that governments are created to perform: 
to encourage activities which, if  left solely to markets, would occur in unfavourable quantities--
or, to use the economist's phrase, less than socially optimal amounts.  The subsidy can be 
supplied in the form of  a monetary payment or other transfer, or through relief of  an opportunity 
cost (Keppler, 1995; Michaelis, 1995). 
Alternatively defined, a subsidy amounts to any government expenditure that makes a 
resource such as energy or water cheaper to produce than its full economic cost.  Conversely, a 
subsidy can make a product, notably food or education, cheaper to consumers.  Energy can be 
made to look cheaper than it really is if subsidies pay some of  its cost.  Many developing 
countries offer "lifeline rates" for electricity, i.e. subsidized discounts on the first increment of 
4 electricity bought each month, thus constituting an implicit expenditure.  These subsidies are 
directed at the poor, and the electricity is made cheaper on the grounds that all citizens, no 
matter how impoverished, should be able to enjoy a modicum of  convenient energy.  Those 
people who cannot be reached by electricity are often given a kerosene subsidy instead.  Most 
energy subsidies in developing countries assist consumers, whereas in developed countries they 
usually support producers. 
The subsidies above are all direct subsidies.  There can be indirect subsidies too. 
Consider road transportation in the United States, where direct subsidies for roads, related 
infrastructure, etc., totalled around $90 billion in 1990 (MacKenzie et aI.,  1992).  lithe value of 
free employee parking--largely stimulated in the first place by the car culture, dependent in turn 
on direct subsidies for road transportation--is included, the figure rises to roughly $140 billion, 
while some economists would add in the costs oftraffic congestion, estimated to be at least 
$100 billion. 
Subsidies can foster not only economic efficiency (at least, that is one oftheir purposes, 
however they turn out in practice). They can also promote social equity.  Subsidy support for 
one activity will cause countervailing effects for other activities: this is a built-in factor.  A 
subsidy is like a cake of  limited size, and if  one person enjoys a larger slice, other persons have 
to make do with smaller slices.  If  everybody receives a subsidy, nobody does.  By their very 
nature, then, subsidies have a marked distributional effect.  This means in turn that subsidies 
carry all manner of  equity implications, as would apply to any situation where a group receives 
financial assistance from the government. Similarly, subsidies can be supplied for social rather 
5 than economic reasons, e.g. to relieve unemployment, to offset disease (notably black lung 
disease in miners), or to correct regional disparities in the notable cases of  Canada and the 
European Union. 
It is these  equity concerns that make subsidies a politically contentious issue.  Whom 
should governments aim to assist through subsidies: the poor, the unemployed, the socially 
disadvantaged, rural residents, entrepreneurs in general and innovators in particular, and both 
sunrise and sunset industries?  The list can be long.  Should the government target many or 
few?  Future equity questions are equally important.  Do we owe anything to our descendants 
in terms of  securing their livelihoods, especially if  that is at the expense of  our own? 
Regrettably, experience shows that in virtually all societies, it is often the powerful who 
obtain subsidies by causing weaker groups to shoulder some of  the costs oftheir activities: "To 
him that hath shall be given."  In the case of  U.S. agriculture, huge subsidies go to a few 
"farmers" who are actually millionaire industrialists and rarely set foot on a farm.  In Colombia, 
the largest 1 percent offarmers receive 50 percent of  public credits, while the smallest 50 
percent offarmers receive little more than 4 percent (Dasgupta, 1994).  In Indonesia, kerosene 
subsidies are supposed to help the poorest people, yet nine- tenths go to richer people (Hope 
and Singh, 1995).  In an international context, annual subsidies for  a dairy cow in the United 
States exceed the per-capita income of  individuals who make up half  the world's population 
(Bovard, 1996). 
6 In addition to subsidies of  conventional type, there is a host of  implicit subsidies, 
especially in the form of  environmental externalities.  Car drivers pollute everyone's atmosphere 
without compensating everyone, so they effectively gain a benefit at everyone's expense.  Much 
the same applies when furmers spray pesticides which then extend their toxic effects into 
everyone's ecosystems; and when industrialists fail to clean up and recycle water taken from 
everyone's water supplies, which are becoming increasingly scarce in many lands.  However 
little it is acknowledged, these activities amount to uncompensated services from society to 
individuals.  They should count as implicit subsidies in both spirit and substance, even though 
they are not dispensed by a government department.  They are as economically distorting and 
socially unfair as any financial subsidy. 
Environmental externalities are widespread and significant, and growing fast.  The 
current level of  environmental injury is ample evidence that they should be included in a 
comprehensive assessment of  subsidies.  In Costa Rica, for instance, the depletion of  soils, 
forests and fisheries results in a 25-30 percent reduction in potential economic growth.  Soil 
erosion worldwide levies unintended costs on society of  around $150 billion per year, while 
pesticides harm society's interests to the extent of  $1 00 billion per year--and these two items 
alone mean that such hidden subsidies are ahnost as large as the formal subsidies in agriculture. 
Environmental externalities are adverse by definition, and their societal costs make them 
economically adverse too. 
7 II. LEADING DEVELOPMENT SECTORS: THEIR PERVERSE SUBSIDIES 
Let us now consider the role of  perverse subsidies in the four development sectors 
designated above.  There is not space in this short paper to examine all four of  them in detail. 
Better to take an extended look at the first one, agriculture, and to use that as an illustration of 
how the various subsidies can affect the other three sectors. 
I. Agriculture 
Over the past several decades, higher harvests have been achieved by more irrigation, 
pesticides and chemical fertilizers among other forms of  modernized farming; and these 
measures have been widely fostered by subsidies.  Many if  not most such subsidies appear to be 
costly to the economy, and are often harmful to the environment, including the natural-resource 
base that underpins agriculture.  For instance, pesticides and chemical fertilizers severely 
contaminate water supplies; short-rotation cropping and reduced fallows exacerbate soil erosion; 
high-yielding monocultures causes genetic wipe-out among old varieties of  food plants; land 
clearing for agriculture is the largest single cause of  deforestation; and many agricultural 
activities release greenhouse gases (Batie, 1996; Faeth, 1995; Gardner, 1996; OECD, 1997; 
Runge, 1994). 
What is the rationale for agricultural subsidies?  Why should farmers need a helping hand 
at all from the government?  There are several arguments.  First is that governments consider it 
a prime responsibility to keep their citizens fed, so they feel duty bound to support farmers. 
Secondly, farmers worldwide have often been among the poorer segments of  society, so they 
have been thought to deserve "a little extra".  This applies especially in developing countries, 
8 where farmers generally form the majority of  the population and governments are keen to keep 
them in favour.  Thirdly, and again in developing countries, many subsidies have been justified in 
times past as vital foundations of  the Green Revolution; they enabled the one third expansion of 
irrigated lands and the tripling of  fertilizer use, thus helping to double crop yields.  Overall, 
subsidies aim to guarantee food supplies, to keep farm prices stable, to maintain farming as a 
vibrant economic sector, and to support rural communities. 
For all these reasons, financial support to agriculture has become an ancient and 
entrenched tradition in countries right around the world.  Farmers have become extremely 
powerful politically, leaving governments feeling that to  reduce agricultural subsidies would be 
to forfeit a pivotal part ofthe electorate. 
Agricultural subsidies come in many shapes and sizes.  As well as the obvious practice of 
encouraging farmers to use more inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation,  machinery, etc.), 
subsidies can simply boost farm incomes by means of  price supports.  Less directly, they can 
facilitate marketing of  crops by enhancing transportation networks.  They can relieve weather 
problems and other risks by providing insurance.  They can foster credit flows.  They can 
stimulate conversion of  wetlands to agriculture.  In developed countries, governments typically 
guarantee minimum prices for crops at levels above the market, while in developing countries 
governments primarily suppress furm prices in order to keep city communities happy with cheap 
food.  Many governments subsidize artificial pesticides and fertilizers. 
9 Certain ofthese subsidies are well and good within particular perspectives.  Not so 
justifiable are subsidies fostering crops grown in regions that would not have grown them at all 
had a free market existed.  Notable examples are ultra-thirsty crops such as alfalfa and rice in 
California's desertlands.  Also irrational are those many subsidies that may have made sense 
when they were first established but have since become obsolete or bloated, or both.  In the 
European Union, excess production has lead to milk and wine lakes and  butter and beef 
mountains (not to mention a manure mountain in the Netherlands).  In early 1993 cereal 
surpluses of30 million tonnes would have been enough to provide an Italian-style diet to 75 
million people for one year (Ritson and Harvey, 1995).  Taxpayers footed the bill to supply the 
subsidies that boosted these crops in the first place, then they paid again to store the excess 
stockpiles. 
Subsidies generate absurd outcomes in other ways too.  Many countries pay their 
farmers to leave land fallow, whereupon they subsidize them to engage in directly conflicting 
activities, e.g. to plant crops and practice fallowing simultaneously.  Or consider the travels if 
not the travails of  materials needed to make the 150g of  daily yoghurt beloved by many German 
consumers.  To reach one ofthe main distribution outlets in southern Germany, ingredients are 
transported from all around the country, even from Netherlands and Poland.  To do the job, a 
theoretical truck must travel 850 kilometres.  It is enabled to do so in part by bountiful subsidies 
from the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy (Hird and Paxton, 1994).  Much more 
efficient in both economic and environmental terms would be for yoghurt producers to utilize 
local ingredients, but they have no incentive to do so as long as subsidized supplies can 
apparently do the job more cheaply. 
10 In addition to economic dislocations, subsidies cause much environmental injury. 
Pesticides under conventional application regimes cause well-known hazards to human health 
even as they undermine their own usefulness.  Excessive applications of  nitrogenous fertilizers 
lead to washed-off  nitrates contaminating drinking water supplies with threats to human health. 
Intensified farming with heavy machinery aggravates soil erosion, as does the decline of  crop 
rotations. 
Irrigation agriculture is far and away the largest user of  water worldwide, and subsidies 
encourage farmers to mis-use and over-use water on a grand scale, despite the growing 
evidence of  sizeable  water shortages impending (Engelman and LeRoy, 1995; Gleick, 1997; 
Postel, 1997).  Many agricultural activities contribute to global warming through emissions of 
carbon dioxide from fossil fuels, methane from ruminant livestock and rice paddies, and nitrous 
oxides from disturbed soils.  These environmental externalities are widespread and unusually 
significant, and they merit detailed examination later in this chapter. 
In 1996, financial transfers to agriculture in OECD countries amounted to around $300 
billion (OECD, 1997; see also de Moor, 1997).  While this was higher than the 1986/88 average, 
it was down from the 1993/95 level by $30-40 billion.  This recent fall reflected higher grain 
prices on world markets rather than government efforts to reduce subsidies.  When prices slip 
again, subsidies may well revert to their former level ifnot higher.  These subsidies exerted 
profound impact on not just the agriculture sector but on the economy at large.  They equated to 
1.3 percent ofthe collective GDPs of24 OECD "core" countries, to more than 2 percent of 
GDP in Norway and Switzerland, more than 1 percent in the European Union as a whole, and 
11 1.5 percent in Japan (OECD, 1997; see also Hepher, 1997). 
These government outlays were sizeable for individual farmers.  In 1996, the OECD 
average was almost $14,500, in the United States $27,240, in the European Union $17,474, in 
Japan $30,090, and $42,700 in Switzerland (though in New Zealand only $1825, for reasons 
explained below).  For details of  all leading OECD countries, see Table I. The payments 
amounted to  30 percent of  farmers' revenues in the United States, 45 percent in Canada, 48 
percent in the European Union, 65 percent in Japan, and 77 percent in Norway, with an average 
of  44 percent in OECD countries as a whole (though only 15 percent in Australia and 4 percent 
in New Zealand) (OECD, 1997).  They were sizeable too for consumers because of  increased 
food prices and taxes.  In a Western industrialized country in 1996, consumers paid an extra 
food bill of  at least $350;  in the United States, $259; in the European Union, $322; in Norway, 
$767; in Switzerland, $935; and in Japan, $617 (contrast Australia, only $89 and New Zealand 
$66) (Hepher, 1997; OECD, 1997). 
Regrettably the environmental resource base underpinning agriculture is being widely 
degraded (Pimentel et aI., 1996; Scherr and Yadav, 1996; Swaminathan, 1996).  Much of  this 
degradation can be ascribed in part at least to agricultural subsidies that foster over- exploitative 
agriculture (Bonnis, 1995; MacNeill, 1994; Maier and Steenblik, 1995).  Consider soil erosion. 
During the past 20 years some 500 billion tonnes oftopsoil have been eroded away, roughly 
equivalent to all the topsoil in India's  croplands.  Currently somewhere between  25 billion 
tonnes and 75 billion tonnes (Pimentel et aI.,  1995) of  topsoil are lost each year, two-thirds of  it 
from agricultural lands.  During the past 40 years, at least 4.3 million square kilometres of 
12 Table I 
AGRICULTURE SUBSIDIES IN OECD COUNTRIES, * 1996 
C_ountrylRegion  Subsidies**  ~ubsidies ($) 
(billion $)  Per full-time farmer  Per hectare of  Per consumer 
-~  --
agricultural land 
European Union  120.3  17,474  825  322 
Japan  77.4  30,090  15,107  617 
United States  68.7  27,240  161  259 
Switzerland  6.7  42,701  4,213  935 
Canada  4.8  11,225  66  161 
Norway  3.4  40,362  3,287  767 
Australia  1.6  4,205  4  89 
New Zealand  0.2  1,825  14  66 
OECD  297.1  14,493  254  334 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997 
*excluding Mexico and other recent members. 
**inc1uding increased food prices for consumers. croplands have been abandoned because of  soil loss, an expanse equivalent to 30 percent of 
today's croplands.  Without better soil-conservation practices, between 1.4 million and 2.0 
million square kilometres (the smaller expanse is equal to Alaska) will lose most oftheir good-
quality soil over the next two decades--and this will apply in parts ofIndiana and India alike.  If 
soil erosion is allowed to continue virtually unchecked, it could well cause a decline of 19-29 
percent in food production fromrainfed croplands during the  25 years 1985-2010 (Greenland et 
aI.,  1994). 
The on-site costs of  soil erosion are borne by farmers themselves, so they are not 
considered to be a cost pushed off  onto society and hence a hidden subsidy.  Of  course the loss 
of  cropland productivity results in higher food costs for consumers, so to that extent society 
eventually pays part of  the on-farm cost.  In the longer run, moreover, soil erosion will impose 
much bigger costs on society if  the world without enough topsoil finds itself unable to grow 
enough food: that would be an externality indeed.  Let us limit the calculation, however, to costs 
borne by off-farm society, these being costs that sooner or later must be picked up by the public 
at large.  Upshot: soil erosion costs are an implicit subsidy from society to farmers.  According 
to recent research (Pimentel et aI.,  1995), the off-farm costs worldwide can be put at $150 
billion per year, being just under two-fifths of  total costs. 
According to on-going calculations (Myers and Kent, 1997, in prep.), conventional 
subsidies to agriculture in OECD countries now amount to $300 billion per year,  and $25 
billion in non-OECD countries, for a total of$325 billion per year. In addition, there are the 
environmental externalities of  soil erosion, $150 billion per year, and pesticides, $100 billion per 
13 year; total, $250 billion per year.  This makes for a grand total of$575 billion per year. 
How many of  these subsidies shall we consider are perverse? Certain subsidies have 
sometimes been beneficial in certain local and short-term respects, but many subsidies reveal 
scope to exert long-run injury  on both economies and environments writ large.  The 
documentation above makes plain that there are many unfortunate repercussions of  agricultural 
subsidies.  Remarkably, New Zealand has eliminated virtually all its subsidies, and the country's 
economy and environment alike are better off, as is agreed on all sides.  To this limited extent, 
we could reasonably assume that virtually all subsidies in agriculture anywhere are perverse. 
This would perhaps be pushing the point too far.  For purposes ofthis paper and its need to 
come up with some concluding figure, however far from conclusive, a total for perverse 
subsidies is proposed that is 65 percent of  the formal subsidies total, viz. $211 billion, or say 
$210 billion, per year.  The true proportion could be 15 percent higher or lower, which 
postulates a range of$163-260 billion, say $160-260 billion, per year.  The author believes it is 
unlikely to lie outside this range--unless better- judgement assessments can demonstrate 
otherwise. 
On top of  this are the environmental externalities described above, and considered to be 
hidden subsidies from society to agriculture.  Just the two instances cited amount to $250 billion 
per year.  Since they are adverse for the environment by definition and adverse for the economy 
through their quantified costs, they are all viewed as perverse subsidies. 
So the aggregate total of  perverse subsidies is estimated to be $460 billion per year, 
within a range of  $390 billion to $520 billion. 
14 Within a broader economic context, these figures must  clearly rank as a low estimate. 
Consider some further indirect costs.  Agricultural subsidies do much to distort trade patterns 
and even to heighten political tensions among the international community, especially as 
concerns North/South relationships (Legg, 1993).  Subsidies in developed countries make it 
unduly  hard for developing countries to compete in international markets, thus reinforcing the 
inefficiency of  their agriculture (Pearce, 1995).  A modicum of  liberalization of  agricultural trade 
would be worth $150 billion to the global economy by 2002, most of  it due to cutbacks in farm 
protection; full liberalization would be worth almost $400 billion a year (1991  values). European 
GDP would be 2.5 percent higher, and some Asia economies could benefit by 8 percent; the 
United States' balance oftrade would be $42 billion better off  (Goldin and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 1996; Maier and Steenblik, 1995). 
These knock-on effects of  international trade deserve a further look.  Subsidized exports 
have undermined developing-country livelihoods by flooding local markets with cheap imported 
food, as witness the impact of  European Union beef  dumped in West Africa.  Pastoral farmers in 
Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso sell animals in local markets, which during the late 1980s were 
disrupted by European beef  subsidized enough to be sold at one third of  the normal price.  Also 
in West Africa, cheap wheat imports have displaced traditional food staples in indigenous diets. 
Wheat imports into the coastal region have been increasing by over 8 percent per year for the 
past decade, while per-capita production of  sorghum  and millet has been falling.  By driving 
down local prices, wheat imports have done much to damage rural livelihoods (Watkins, 1995). 
15 2.  Fos~il Fuels, Road Transportation and Water 
Now for a cursory look at the other three leading development sectors.  Fossil fuels rank 
as one of  the largest enterprises ofhurnankind, and they are central to most economies 
worldwide.  They can bestow abundant benefits.  They also have great capacity to harm the 
enviromnent through their pollution impacts, manifested through urban smog, acid rain and 
global warming.  Urban smog leads to asthma, emphysema and a host of  other respiratory ills, 
while acid rain imposes extensive damage on biotas.  As for global warming, this is widely 
regarded as the most important single problem in the enviromnental arena. Overall, fossil fuels 
generate such marked pollution that some analysts (Koplow, 1995; Lovins, 1996) consider the 
enviromnental costs offossil fuels are at least equal to and possibly much greater than the more 
conventional and recognized costs.  Similarly, subsidies for fossil fuels can harm the economy 
through their markedly distortive effects.  So the sector as a whole has large potential for 
perverse subsidies. 
Energy--or rather the production and distribution of  energy--is often controlled in major 
measure by the state.  This means that many govermnents playa central role in setting energy 
prices.  The failure of  govermnents to price energy properly means that consumption is higher, 
grows faster, and is more polluting than it should be. All in all, fossil fuels cost society many 
billions of  dollars more than their users pay directly.  There is a plethora of  hidden costs: tax 
policies supply credits, exemptions, deferrals, preferential rates, loans, loan guarantees, 
exclusions, deductions, R and D programs, depletion allowances, accelerated depreciation, risk 
insurance, and regulatory costs.  While these tax policies may have served a productive purpose 
when they were first introduced, many have now exceeded their usefulness, yet they remain on 
16 production during World War I.  This was an entirely valid reason at the time, though it has long 
run out of  rationale even while the tax subsidy persists. 
Total subsidies for fossil fuels can be estimated at around $\30 billion per year, and 
perverse subsidies at $100 billion (Myers and Kent, 1997; see also de Moor, 1997; Roodman, 
1996).  As for the other two sectors listed, viz. road transportation and water (there is not space 
to examine them even in passing--for details, see Myers and Kent, 1997), the first features total 
subsidies of$917 billion and perverse subsidies of$639 per year.  The second features total 
subsidies of$233 billion and perverse subsidies of$219 billion per year. 
III. OVERALL FINDINGS 
The overall findings are set out in Table 2.  Total subsidies are estimated to total $1,855 
billion per year, and perverse subsidies $1,418 billion.  Plainly, then, perverse subsidies have the 
capacity to (a) exert a highly distortive impact on the global economy of$28 trillion, and (b) 
inflict grandscale injuries on our environments.  On both counts, they foster unsustainable 
development.  Ironically the total of $1.4 trillion is almost two and a half times as large as the 
Rio Earth Summit's budget for sustainable development--a sum that governments dismissed as 
unthinkable. 
Note that: 
* The OEeD countries account for two thirds of  all subsidies and an even larger share of 
perverse subsidies. 
* The United States accounts for 21  percent of  perverse subsidies. 
17 Table 2 
Sector  Conventional Subsidies' 
Agriculture  325 
Fossil Fuels  130 
Road Transportation  558 
Water  58 
Totals  1,071 
SUBSIDIES: OVERALL TOTALS 
























• Subsidies of  established and readily recognized sorts, including both direct financial transfers and indirect supports such as tax credits. 
*  *  Ranges: some ofthese estimates are supported by ranges: for details, see text. In some instances, ranges are not inserted because there is 
simply too little agreement even about ranges! 
*** Remarkably it has not been possible to come up with even a reasonably agreed estimate for this value: the data are too patchy and disparate. * The single sector of  road transportation accounts for 49 percent of  all subsidies and 45 
percent of  perverse subsidies. 
Leading instances of  perversity include: 
I. German coal is subsidized to the extent to $6.7 billion per year.  It would be 
economically efficient (and would reduce coal pollution such as acid rain and global warming) 
for the government to close down all the mines and send the workers home on full pay for the 
rest of  their lives. 
2.  The global ocean fisheries catch--well above sustainable yield--is annually worth 
more than $100 billion at dockside, where it is sold for some $80 billion, the shortfall being 
made up with government subsidies.  The result is depletion of  many major fisheries to 
commercial extinction, plus bankruptcy of  fishing businesses and sizeable unemployment. 
3.  In the United States, one government agency heavily subsidizes irrigation for crops 
that another agency pays farmers not to grow. To cite the comment of  an economist critic, Paul 
Hawken (1997), "The government subsidizes energy costs so that farmers can deplete aquifers 
to grow alfalfa to feed cows that make milk that is stored in warehouses as surplus cheese that 
does not feed the hungry." 
4.  Also in the United States, gasoline is now cheaper than bottled water, thanks to 
subsidies of  many sorts.  Despite the view of  many Americans that gasoline is expensive, it now 
costs less in real terms than for 60 years.  The same applies to many other aspects of  U.S. road 
transportation, thanks to extensive subsidies.  Well might it be said that Detroit and the oil 
18 companies are on a kind of  welfare.  The unpaid costs of  road transportation amount to $464 
billion per year, which is equivalent to $1700 per American.  Hidden subsidies for oil serve to 
create an energy policy by default--a policy that is actually the reverse ofthe government's 
stated priorities.  Oil subsidies prolong the country's risky dependence on foreign supplies, 
especially from the Persian Gulf.  Moreover, this de facto energy policy discourages private 
investments in new, cleaner technologies such as hyper-cars and other revolutionary forms of 
energy efficiency (Lovins, 1996). 
All in all, a typical American taxpayer is paying at least $2000 a year in perverse 
subsidies, and paying ahnost another $2000 more for consumer goods and services  with their 
incrased prices, or through environmental degradation. 
Let us reiterate the many forms of  concealed costs inherent in perverse subsidies: 
* Economically they push up the costs of  government, inducing higher taxes and prices 
for all.  In tum, this means they aggravate budget deficits. 
* They divert government funds from better options for fiscal support. 
• They distort economies in numerous other ways.  For instance, they undermine market 
decisions about investment, and they reduce the pressure for businesses to become more 
efficient. 
* They tend to benefit the few at the expense 0 f the many, and, worse, the rich at the 
expense of  the poor. 
* They can serve to pay the po  lluter. 
* They foster many other forms of  environmental degradation, which apart from their 
19 intrinsic harm, act as a further drag on economies. 
For all these reasons, perverse subsidies militate against sustainable development.  They 
are a no-no whether economically or environmentally or socially.  Despite their irrationality, 
however, perverse subsidies persist virtually untouched.  This is because subsidies tend to create 
special-interest groups and political lobbies, leaving the subsidies hard to remove long after they 
have served their original purpose.  In all major capitals, there are swarms ofiobbyists, 
sometimes a hundred or more for each legislator.  By definition, these lobbyists  are bent on 
advancing narrow sectoral interests rather than the public good.  In face of  subsidy support of 
this scale and leverage, most efforts to cut back on even the most perverse subsidies amount to 
spectacular failure. 
The perverse subsidies total of$1.4 trillion is twice as large as global military spending 
per year, and almost twice as large as the annual growth in the world's economy.  It is larger 
than the top twelve corporations' annual sales.  It is three times as much as the annual cash 
incomes ofthe 1.3 billion poorest people, and three times as much as the international narcotics 
industry.  Were just half of  these perverse subsidies to be phased out, just half of  the funds 
released would enable most governments to abolish their budget deficits at a stroke, to reorder 
their fiscal priorities in fundamental fashion, and to restore our environments more vigorously 
than through any other single measure. 
20 IV. POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We may have reached a propitious time to tackle perverse subsidies.  Many governments 
are espousing the marketplace economy with  its reduced scope for government intervention. 
Many governments also face fiscal constraints that give them further incentive to reduce activist 
roles in their economies.  So the political climate for radical reform of  subsidies is probably 
better than for decades.  The transition economies in particular face an admirable opportunity 
thanks to their  political and economic liberalization.  At the same time, the OECD countries 
have a special responsibility to set the pace in that they account for roughly two thirds of  all 
subsidies and an even larger share  of  all perverse subsidies. 
In addition, there is now a solid track record of  countries that have greatly reduced or 
even abolished some of  their subsidies.  This should serve as a helpful precedent for other 
countries. 
• New Zealand has eliminated virtually all its agricultural susbidies since the early 1980s, 
even though--or perhaps because--its economy is more dependent on agriCUlture than most 
OECD countries.  Today there are more farmers in New Zealand than when the subsidy phase-
out began.  Several Latin American countries, notably Chile and Argentina, have recently taken 
to slashing their agricultural subsidies. 
• Russia has reduced its fossil fuel subsidies from $29 billion in 1990-91 to $9 billion in 
1995-96.  China has slashed its subsidies from $25 billion to $10 billion (World Bank, 1997). 
* Brazil has gone far to cut back its subsidies for cattle ranching in Amazonia, thus 
21 reducing deforestation. 
* Since the mid-1980s, Bangladesh and several other Asian countries have recognized 
that excessive applications  of  nitrogenous fertilizers, stimulated by extravagant subsidies, are 
wasteful in economic terms and highly polluting in environmental terms (eutrophication of 
waterways, threats to drinking water supplies).  Indonesia has reduced its fertilizer subsidies 
from $732 million to $96 million per year; Pakistan from $178 million to $2 million; Bangladesh 
from $56 million to zero;  and Philippines from $48 million to zero (World Bank, 1997). 
How shall we set about the challenge of  reducing perverse subsidies within the body 
politic?  There are various policy openings available. One generalized option is to be 
opportunistic and to seize on emergent "windows" such as the recent strong political shift in 
fuvor of  marketplace-ism.  The credo of  the marketplace stands opposed to subsidies, let alone 
perverse subsidies, as a form of  government intervention that ipso fucto must be distortive and 
counter-productive (this applies especially to the economies in transition with their switch to 
market liberalism).  Resistance to subsidies in general also sterns from the privatization ethos 
which is becoming widespread.  There can even be opportunity in economic crisis, such as the 
one which spurred New Zealand's move to drop agricultural subsidies: the public economy was 
finally over-burdened to breaking point.  India's subsidies total over 14 percent ofGDP, yet the 
government wishes to bring down its fiscal deficit to under 4 percent ofGDP, thus supplying 
marked motivation to cut subsidies drastically.  There could be parallel scope in the wake of  an 
environmental crisis such as another Chemobyl-type disaster. 
22 These formidable opportunities are matched by formidable obstacles.  There are the 
special-interest groups, which often feel so addicted to their "entitlements" that they suffer 
severe withdrawal pangs at talk of  cutting back any subsidies, let alone perverse subsidies.  They 
find allies in bureaucratic roadblocks and institutional inertia.  Then there can be upsets to equity 
concerns, especially with regard to who no longer gets what.  Finally there is uncertainty about 
how reduction of  perverse subsidies, however rational in principle, will work out in nitty-gritty 
practice; for instance, will it mean losing a competitive edge to competitors abroad? 
There are various ways to overcome these obstacles.  One is to formulate alternative 
policies that target the same subsidy objectives better, while also compensating  losers.  A 
related measure is to develop an economic-policy context that encourages subsidy removal 
through e.g. reducing government controls generally and freeing up markets.  A subsidiary 
measure is to introduce "sunset" provisions that require surviving subsidies to be re-justified 
periodically, thus avoiding the entrenchment problem.  All these measures can be strongly 
reinforced by promoting transparency about perverse subsidies, especially as concerns their 
impacts both economic and environmental, and their costs to both taxpayers and consumers. 
Perhaps the most important way of  all to overcome obstacles to reform is to build 
support constituencies, especially among the public.  The more citizens know that their tax 
dollars and consumer payments are going down a rathole of  perverse subsidies, the more there 
will be political support for reform.  These constituencies--with an interest in the public good 
rather than sectoral benefit  --can engage in information campaigns about the perversity of  certain 
subsidies.  Governments carmot deal with perverse subsidies without first learning about the 
23 nature and extent ofthese subsidies.  Yet information, especially statistical data, is often 
incomplete and fragmented across agencies, if  it exists at all.  An information campaign stands a 
better chance of  success when it stems from grassroots activism, i.e. from the taxpayers and 
consumers who are penalized by perverse subsidies. 
There has been a success story on this front in the United States, where 
environmentalists such as Friends ofthe Earth, the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society have 
made common cause with economic reformers such as Citizens for Tax Justice, Taxpayers for 
Common $ense and the Public Interest Research Group.  This coalition of22 NGOs has 
highlighted perverse subsidies through their periodic "Green Scissors" reports.  The most recent 
report fingers 47 government projects worth $39 billion over five years, with items ranging from 
over-logging ofthe Tongass National Forest and price supports for cotton to a royalty holiday 
for deepwater oil drilling and aid to the Three Gorges Dam in China.  The whistle blowing has 
done much to mobilize the social consensus and political will to tackle the offending subsidies. 
There are supplementary measures such as (a) regulation via environmental standards, 
tradable quotas, limits to resource exploitation, and the polluter pays principle and the 
precautionary principle; (b) user charges for goods and services--whether as concerns energy, 
transportation, water, timber,  whatever--that will encourage more careful use; (c) tradable 
permits, the largest inside the United States being the 1990 Clean Air Act that allows permits to 
emit sulphur dioxide; (d) green taxes as a prime mode to change people's behavior toward the 
environment; and (e) environmental subsidies in support of  e.g. agri-environmental measures to 
support soil conservation and wetland protection. 
24 When once we start to remove perverse subsidies, it will be essential to measure 
progress.  To meet this purpose, a number of  principles have been formulated by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (Barg, 1996).  Performance assessment 
should (a) be guided by a clear visison of  sustainable development as the justifYing framework 
for subsidy reform; (b) include a review of  the entire economic sector in question; (c) evaluate 
the economic, environmental and human subsystems at issue, covering all costs and benefits in 
both monetary and non-monetary terms; and (d) consider equity factors within communities, 
also between present and future generations, with focus on such concerns as poverty and over-
consumption, also human rights.  Taken together, these principles can constitute a "template" 
for measuring progress toward sustainable development.  The task should be undertaken by 
governments that are ready to devise a consistent framework for statistical analysis of  perverse 
subsidies in all salient sectors, through e.g. a radical revision of  their  national accounts. 
Thereafter they will need to standardize and disseminate their information as a routine practice. 
If  they were to be reduced, however (while still leaving lots of  subsidies to placate 
special interests), there would actually be a double dividend: 
1. There would be an end to the formidable obstacles imposed by perverse subsidies on 
sustainable development. 
2. There would be a huge stock of  funds available to give a new push to sustainable 
development--funds on a scale that would be unlikely to become available through any other 
source.  In the case ofthe United States, for instance, they would amount to more than $300 
billion.  This is larger than the Pentagon budget, $240 billion, and almost twice the federal 
25 deficit, $126 billion. 
Compare the prospect to a car.  Reducing perverse subsides would be like, firstly, taking 
the brakes off  and moving into high gear.  Secondly it would be like  giving the engine  and all 
the other major mechanisms such a streamlining that the car would operate with undreamed of 
efficiency. 
At the same time, reducing perverse subsidies would help change consumption patterns, 
especially in affluent societies.  "Affluent societies" refers to not just the rich countries, but to 
the newly consumerist communities in many developing countries.  In southeastern China, 
several countries of  Southeast Asia, parts ofIndia, also Mexico and Brazil, likewise Russia and 
other countries of  the former Soviet bloc, there are now 750 million people with enough 
discretionary income to allow them to engage in many of  the consumerist habits that 
characterize the "good life" of  affluent countries.  In 1995 there were more cars sold in Asia 
than in Western Europe and North America combined.  Were these 750 million people, whose 
numbers match the 750 million established consumers of  Western countries, to seek to adopt all 
the consumption patterns of  the long-standing consumers, there would be dire results for 
environmental stability and social equity in much of  the world--and the Sustainable Development 
prospect would be severely set back. 
If, by contrast, the long established consumers were obliged to pay the full social cost of 
their consumerism, they would have to swiftly modiJY their views ofthe good life.  A prime way 
to achieve this shift is to get rid of  perverse subsidies.  Were Americans, for example, to pay the 
$1700 that each of  them enjoys on average through the unpaid costs oftheir car culture, and pay 
26 $5 a gallon of  gasoline (if  that were the best way to internalize the externalities), they would 
surely start to drive less and travel more by public transportation.  In turn, this would spur a 
strong demand for acceptable public transportation, which could well be subsidized to reflect the 
social benefits (there can be "good" subsidies that support the environment, the economy, and 
social equity). 
Indeed it is hard to think of  any single measure that governments can take to better help 
their environments, economies and social justice, than to divest themselves of  perverse 
subsidies.  A win-win situation of  exceptional capacity. 
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